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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
Rae Lynn Jones (12/28/71) 
Robert William Jones (07/27/74) 
James Robert Jones, Jr. (02/07/76) 
RESPONDENTS' 
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Case No. 18189 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE · 
The appellant appeals from the Judgment of the Second 
District Juvenile Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Judith F. Whitmer, presiding, granting the 
petition of respondent James Robert Jones to terminate the 
parental rights of appellant, Vina Rae Jones Patereau, in the 
above-named children. All parental rights of appellant in said 
children were terminated by order of the juvenile court on 
grounds of abandonment pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated section 78-3a-48(1)(b) (Supp. 1981). The court then 
ordered legal custody of the children vested in LDS Social 
Services for adoptive placement. The court found that appellant, 
the children's mother, had abandoned the children in that her 
conduct evidenced a conscious disregard for her parental 
obligations and that this disregard had led to the destruction of 
the parent-child relationship. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Second District Juvenile Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable Judith F. Whitmer, presiding, after trial 
entered an order permanently terminating all parental rights of 
appellant, on the·grounds that· her conduct indicated that she had 
abandoned the children. The matter was before the juvenile court 
on the petition of the children's father, respondent James Robert 
Jones. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judqment of the 
juvenile court, while appellant seeks reversal of that judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Vina Rae Jones Patereau, is the natural mother of 
the three children: Rae Lynn Jones, born December 28, 1971; 
Robert William Jones, born July 27, 1974; and James Robert Jones, 
Jr., born February 7, 1976 (hereinafter "children"). Respondent 
James Robert Jones is the father of the children. Appellant and 
respondent separated in April of 1977. (R.2). Appellant took 
the children with her when she separated from respondent, but was 
unable to arrange for their care. She returned the children to 
respondent after a few days. (R.17). 
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Appellant and respondent were divorced on April 30, 1978, at 
the instance of respondent, approximately one year after 
appellant had left respondent. The decree of divorce awarded 
respondent custody of the children and required appellant to pay 
$15 per month per child in support for the children. Respondent 
cared for the children from April, 1977, a few days after the 
parties' separation, until they were placed in foster care 
through LDS Social Services in December, 1980. (R.8-9). 
Appellant did not,assist in the financial support of the 
children, either during the separation or after the divorce. 
(R.5). During the entire period commencing with the separation 
and continuing after the divorce until the present {over four 
years time), appellant visited the children only four or five 
times. Her most recent visit with the children, which was for a 
weekend, took place in February, 1980. (R.9-10). 
Since prior to the separation of the parties, respondent has 
continuously had the same place of employment and has always 
resided within a few miles of appellant. He and the children 
were accessible to appellant at his work place and through his 
relatives with whom she was acquainted. (R.4). No written 
communications were received by the children from appellant after 
the parties' separation. Appellant also failed to telephone the 
children. She even ignored them at Christmas and on their 
birthdays. She never sent them presents nor asked about their 
health or happiness either by telephone or by letter. (R.5). 
In the fall of 1980, respondent requested assistance from 
LDS Social Services in selecting and monitoring a suitable foster 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
home for the children. He sought to place the children in foster 
care because he was having difficulty arranging baby sitters and 
felt that frequently changing sitters was harmful to them. They 
were formally placed in foster care in December of 1980. (R.6). 
Prior to making the foster care arrangement, respondent 
sought to counsel with appellant, but she refused to discuss the 
matter with him except in the hostile·company of her new husband 
and her mother-in-law. (R.7). Soon thereafter, appellant 
apparently learned of the children's placement in foster care, 
but she took no action with respect to their placement until 
August of 1981. {R.22, 52). 
Respondent and his counsel were unable to locate appellant 
in order to serve upon her the petition for an order of permanent 
deprivation of parental rights. Thus, the summons was published 
in "The Salt Lake Tribune". Only then did respondent contact LDS 
Social Services, although no mention of that agency was made in 
the published summons. (R.54, 104). 
After several continuances granted by the court in order to 
permit appellant to engage counsel and to allow her to assist him 
in the preparation of her defense, the petition of respondent to 
terminate the parental rights of appellant was finally tried in 
juvenile court on October 23, 1981. An order permanently 
depriving appellant of parental rights in the children was 
entered November 30, 1981. The children were adopted by their 
foster parents on December 21, 1981. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE JUVENILE COURT'S FINDING OF 
ABANDONMENT UNLESS THERE IS A CLEAR SHOWING OF ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. 
This court has repeatedly declared that a trial judge's 
finding of abandonment should be upheld unless there is a clear 
showing of an abuse of discretion. The general rule consistently 
applied by this court in appellate review is that the findings of 
the trial judge are to be given great weight because of his or 
her opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses. This 
court has also held that it will presume that the trier of fact 
believed those aspects of the evidence which support the findings 
and judgment being appealed. 
In Robertson v. Hutchinson, 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977), this 
court said that because of the trial court's advantage in judging 
credibility, sensing personality, and hearing the facts first 
hand, its judgment was to be upheld, even if reasonable minds 
could differ. 
[W]hether there has been an abandonment generally 
depends upon the facts of each case; and where the 
evidence is such that reasonable minds might differ 
thereon, it is a question of fact which it is the 
prerogative of the fact-trier to determine. 
Ia. at 112. 
-5-
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This same conservative standard of review was affirmed one 
year later in State in the Interest of S J 
H J , and s J , 576 P.2d 1280 
--~~~~--------------:.------------------------------
(Utah 1978), when this court declared that it was well established 
that the factual determinations of juvenile courts were "not to 
be overturned absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion." 
Id. at 1282. 
In the most recent case of Adoption of McKinstray v. 
McKinstry, 628 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1981), this court declared that 
even though a strict evidentiary standard was required in 
abandonment cases, the reasonable conclusions of trial courts 
should not be interfered with. 
Regardless of the strict evidentiary standard required 
in an abandonment case, the issues in most instances, 
including the present case, are factual, and as stated 
in Hall v. Anderson, supra, "if the evidence is such 
that reasonable minds may differ as to the conclusion 
to be drawn therefrom, it is the prerogative of the 
trier of facts to make the determination; and this 
court should not interfere with that prerogative by 
disagreeing with the determination thus made." 
Id. at 1288. 
Judge Whitmer's judgment in the case at hand was based upon 
evidence and testimony regarding the appellant's parental conduct 
over a four and one-half year period of time. The judge's 
finding that the appellant had abandoned her children is clearly 
supported by the evidence and, thus, was within the prerogative 
of the trier of fact. The judgment was therefore not an abuse of 
discretion and should be upheld. 
-6-
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POINT NO. II 
THE APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO SUPPORT OR COMMUNICATE WITH HER 
CHILDREN MORE THAN FIVE TIMES IN OVER FOUR YEARS SATISFIES THIS 
COURT'S DEFINITION OF ABANDONMENT. 
In determining what conduct justifies a finding of abandon-
ment, the applicable standard is an objective, as opposed to a 
subjective, one. This court has warned that it must be careful 
to not focus too much attention on parent's wishful thoughts and 
too little on their conduct. State in the Interest of the 
Summers Children v. Wulffenstein, 560 P.2d 331 (Utah 1977). 
Whether or not there has been an abandonment within the 
meaning of the statute is to be determined objectively, 
taking into account not only the verbal expressions of 
the natural parents but their conduct as parents as 
well. The subjective standard often focuses too much 
attention on the parents' wishful thoughts and hopes 
for the child and too little on the more important 
element of how well the parents have discharged their 
parental responsibility. 
Id. at 334. 
This caution is followed by an objective definition of 
abandonment which consists of conduct on the part of the parent 
which implies a "conscious disregard of the obligations owed by a 
parent to the child, leading to the destruction of the parent-
child relationship." Id. 
A. The Finding of Abandonment Has B~en Upheld in 
Cases S1m1lar to the Present One. 
Adhering to the above-mentioned standard, this court has 
upheld determinations of abandonment in cases similar to the 
-7-
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present one. A juvenile court's finding of abandonment was 
affirmed in Summers Children, supra, where a father, who did not 
have custody, had visited his children only twice in three years, 
had indicated only a minimal interest in the welfare of his 
children, and had demonstrated his inability to acquire a 
suitable home for them. 
In McKinstray, supra, this court upheld the district court's 
finding that a father's failure to pay support for his children 
for several years coupled with his failure to make more than 
token efforts to communicate with them, all without good cause or 
justification, constituted abandonment. 
Rarely seeing her children for a period of over two years 
was the principal fa.ct apparently justifying termination of 
parental rights on the grounds of abandonment in State in the 
Interest of A, 514 P.2d 797 (Utah 1973). 
A district court finding of abandonment under Utah Code 
Annotated section 78-30-5 (1953) was affirmed in Adoption of 
Guzman, 586 P.2d 418 (Utah 1978). The lower court had based its 
decision on the mother's failure, over a four year period, to 
exercise her rights of visitation and on her failure to 
communicate with her children and her former husband. 
In addition to the guidelines contained in the decisions of 
this court, the Utah Legislature has established statutory 
presumptions of abandonment. Although the appellant did not have 
legal custody of the children and termination was accomplished by 
the juvenile court rather than as part of the adoption proceed-
ings, so that neither of these presumptions is strictly appli-
cable, they nevertheless are still instructive. 
-8-
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The Legislature has determined that parents having legal 
custody who surrender physical custody of the child for a period 
of six months and do not, during that period of time, manifest a 
firm intention to resume care or make arrangements for the care 
of the child, shall be presumed to have abandoned the child. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3a-48(1)(b)(Supp. 1981). Abandonment of a child 
shall also be found in adoption proceedings before the district 
court when a parent without good cause has not provided support 
and has made no effort or only token effort to maintain a 
parental relationship with the child. A rebuttable presumption 
that no effort has been made exists if the parent has failed to 
support and communicate with the child for a period of one year 
or longer. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-5(1953). 
In light of the cases and instructive statutory presumptions 
cited, appellant could easily have been found by clear and 
convincing evidence to have abandoned her children. She visited 
them no more than four or five times over a period of almost four 
and one half years. She did not support them financially 
although she was apparently able-bodied and employable. She gave 
them no gifts on birthdays or Christmas, nor did she write or 
call them on any occasion. On those few occasions when she 
inquired aboui visiting the children, she did not ask about their 
health or happiness. Appellant's actions show a consistent 
pattern of ignoring the children and their welfare for almost 
four and one-half years. 
-9-
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B. Cases Where Abandonment Has Not Been Found Are 
~actually Different From This Case. 
Specific cases cited in appellant's brief may be 
distinguished from the instant case. 
The Robertson case, supra, is cited by appellant as one in 
which termination of parental rights was not ordered despite a 
mother's lack of contact with her children for nearly five years. 
In that case, however, the mother, who lived out-of-state, was 
involved in a serious automobile accident in which she sustained 
multiple injuries including several broken bones. As a result 
she was hospitalized and received extensive and expensive medical 
treatment. This court apparently considered these extenuating 
circumstances as justification for such lack of contact and 
affirmed the district court's ruling. 
In Hall v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1977), a father's 
lack of visitation with, and support of, his daughter were 
excused because he had undergone a serious back operation and had 
thus been unemployed during all but five or six months of the 
four years involved and because he had written his daughter 
numerous times while he was incapacitated. 
This court affirmed the district court's ruling with this 
language: 
On the basis of what has been said herein and 
applying the rules of review as set forth in 
the Robertson case referred to above, it is 
our opinion that the evidence is not so clear 
and persuasive that the defendant had deser-
ted and abandoned his child that we would 
upset the refusal of the trial court to so 
Eind. 
Id. at 1251. 
-10-
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Appellant's reliance on the Summers case, supra, is 
misplaced. The Utah Supreme Court merely affirmed the decision 
of the juvenile court, which rejected a subjective standard in 
abandonment cases. 
In State in the Interest of E. and B. v. J. T., 578 P.2d 831 
(Utah 1978), cited by appellant, this court reversed the juvenile 
court decision terminating a mother's parental rights. The main 
! 
ground for reversal according to the opinion was that the 
Division of Family Services had frustrated the mother's efforts 
to regain-custody of her children. No such frustration is 
evidenced in the instant case. 
Appellant cites State in the Interest of A, supra, 
apparently for the proposition that termination is justified by a 
showing that the effort put forth by a mother to visit her 
children was "practically nil," unlike the efforts of appellant. 
It should be noted, however, that the cited case involved a 
mother who had legal custody but was deprived of physical custody 
by Division of Family Services because she neglected her 
children. The abandonment occurred when "she failed to manifest 
a firm intention to resume custody of her children for over two 
years" after they had been taken by the state on grounds of 
neglect. 
Similarly, appellant notes that this court upheld an order 
of the juvenile court that terminated a father's parental rights 
in McKinstray, supra, but contrasts that father's failure to pay 
child support for six years despite his financial ability to do 
-11-
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so, his moving from the city, and his failure to attempt to 
locate his children with the facts in the instant case. Appel-
lant fails to mention several mitigating factors in the cited 
case, ~' that the children and the custodial parent had moved 
at least twice, one of the moves being out of state. Also, that 
the father in the cited case was on the road much of the time as 
a truck driver, making it difficult for him to locate his 
children. Perhaps in this case, as in each of the above 
mentioned cases where on appeal the lower court's decision was 
affirmed, this court simply refused to substitute its own 
judgment or its interpretation of the facts for that of the trial 
court. 
POINT NO. III 
A GUARDIAN AD LITEM NEED NOT HAVE BEEN APPOINTED FOR AND ON 
BEHALF OF THE CHILDREN IN ADVANCE OF TERMINATION OF APPELLANT'S 
PARENTAL RIGHTS. 
This point was not raised by appellant in the juvenile 
court, and appellant is barred from raising it for the first time 
on appeal. 
Respondent agrees with appellant that the rights of the 
children were seriously affected by the termination of 
appellant's parental rights. Respondent asserts, however, that 
such affect on the children was positive. 
Under Utah law a guardian ad litem must be appointed only in 
cases where the infant is a party. Otherwise such an appointment 
is discretionary with the trial court. U.R.C.P. 17(b). 
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The children were not parties to the action. If they were 
not consulted as to their wishes in this case, as appellant urges 
they should have been, it may well have been because of their 
tender age. 
In any event, it is difficult in this case to envision what 
benefits could have been derived by appointment of a guardian, 
let alone why such appointment would have been necessary. This 
was an action brought by one spouse to terminate the parental rights 
of the other spouse in th~ir children. These children had been 
in a foster home for nearly a year under the supervision of both 
a state licensed child-placing agency and of the juvenile court. 
The failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for the children 
was not an abuse of discretion under the circumstances of this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Whitmer's finding that the appellant abandoned her 
children was based upon testimony and evidence that the appellant 
had not supported her children nor communicated with them more 
than five times in almost four and one half years. The evidence 
of abandonment was both clear and convincing. The judgment of 
the juvenile court should therefore be affirmed. 
Dated this 19th day of May, 1982. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
--
by tl;t~11 
..._, !) 
!;1 p/ (_J10,/\--:<' 
Allen '-M. Swan 
84111 
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